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Daubert's Erie Problem
JENNIFER WOLSING*
INTRODUCTION
The National Enquirer's headline screamed, "New Thalidomide Scandal-Experts
Reveal." The story concerned a new drug described as a "vicious body-twisting
crippler" that resulted in "several thousand tragically deformed infants."' The paper
reported that two infants whose mothers took this drug were born without eyes.
Another was born without a brain.2 The Enquirer was talking about Bendectin, a
morning sickness drug marketed by Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Merrell denied any
culpability, but the Enquirer quoted two nationally-renowned experts who
emphatically agreed that Bendectin caused birth defects. 3 The article also invoked
Merrell's previous role in marketing the notorious teratogen4 thalidomide.5
Thalidomide's disastrous effects 6 became widely publicized within a few years of its
release onto the market.
7
* I would like to give very special thanks to Professor John Applegate, Laura Koenig, and
the Indiana Law Journal Volume 81 Notes and Comments Staff for providing helpful
comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism.
1. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITGATION 10-11 (The
Univ. of Mich. Press 1998), quoting New Thalidomide Scandal-Experts Reveal, NAT'L
ENQUIRER, Oct. 1979, at 1. Melvin Belli, the self-proclaimed "king of torts," had contacted the
magazine with the potential story.
2. Id.
3. The Enquirer quoted Alan Done, an expert in drugs' effects on children, and William
McBride, a gynecologist who was among the first to recognize the link between birth defects
and thalidomide in 1961. McBride's evidence was based on his laboratory tests on rabbits and
chicks. Two of eight rabbits receiving higher doses of a chemical similar to Bendectin bore
offspring with skeletal and limb defects. See, e.g., William G. McBride, Teratogenic Effect of
Doxylamine Succinate in New Zealand White Rabbits, 12 IRCS J. OF MED. Sci. 536-37 (1984).
4. A teratogen is an agent, such as a virus, a drug, or radiation, which causes
developmental malformations, particularly of an embryo or fetus. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1784 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 4th ed. 2000).
5. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 64 (University of Pennsylvania
Press 1996); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 111-12
(1991); Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and the Language of Causation, in
PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAw 101 (Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein
& Peter W. Huber, eds., The MIT Press 1993).
6. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warns that even one dose of thalidomide
during pregnancy can cause "stunted... growth of fetal limbs (arms, legs, hands, feet). It also
puts the fetus at risk of other injuries, including eye and ear defects and severe internal defects
of the heart, genitals, kidneys, digestive tract (including lips and mouth), and nervous system."
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION WEB SITE, THALIDOMIDE: IMPORTANT PATIENT INFORMATION,
Sept. 11, 1997, http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/thalidomide.htm.
7. "On December 31, 1960 the first English-language published report raised the
connection between thalidomide and peripheral neuritis." GREEN, supra note 5, at 65. "By
March 1962 there was little doubt remaining that thalidomide was... teratogenic... and
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In contrast, the number of Bendectin babies suffering birth defects was not
statistically significant. Thus, Bendectin did not receive national attention until one
woman, Betty Mekdeci, filed suit against Merrell on behalf of her baby, and the
National Enquirer picked up the story.8 Ms. Mekdeci's suit marked the beginning of
mass tort litigation against the Bendectin manufacturers. Even with a dearth of
evidence demonstrating a causal connection between Bendectin and birth defects, as
well as a mounting body of evidence tending to exonerate Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, jury verdicts favoring the Bendectin plaintiffs prompted a staggering
rise in litigation.
9
The Supreme Court took action for the embattled defendants in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 10 Daubert effectively established the federal trial court
judge as an "evidentiary gatekeeper." Under this new role, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits created strict guidelines for the admission of scientific evidence. The new
federal guidelines are sometimes more severe than the state standards within their
circuits." A federal plaintiff otherwise able to admit evidence of causation in state
court is barred from doing so in federal court, which leads to the case's dismissal on
summary judgment. This outcome difference encourages eligible defendants to remove
to federal courts, thus prejudicing some forum-state plaintiffs.
This Note argues that the outcome differences between the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits and the state courts within their boundaries pose an Erie problem in diversity
cases where the federal rule is stricter than the state rule. 12 Part I discusses the history
of the Bendectin trials. Part II explains the Supreme Court's response to those trials in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Part III contrasts the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits' federal standards with the more lenient standards applied by some
state courts in those federal circuits. Part IV explains how courts properly conduct an
Erie analysis. Part V applies Part IV's Erie analysis to demonstrate that the
discrepancy in practices between state and federal courts constitutes an Erie violation.
Finally, in Part VI, this Note proposes a solution to the Erie problem: federal circuits
should always defer to state standards when determining evidence admissibility in
diversity cases.
13
hideous[ly] toxic[]." Id. at 72.
8. GREEN, supra note 5, at 2-3; Lasagna & Shulman, supra note 5, at 102. Ms. Mekdeci's
suit against Merrell was the predecessor to "several thousand claims by children with birth
defects and their families"--including the claims raised in Daubert. GREEN, supra note 5, at 3.
9. See infra Part I.
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. See infra Part 111.
12. See infra Parts IV, V.
13. Even when the evidence admissibility decision does not impact summaryjudgment, the
federal circuits privilege defendants' interests over plaintiffs' interests. Therefore, although this
Note focuses on evidence that impacts summary judgment decisions, its conclusion applies to
all evidentiary decisions.
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I. BENDECTIN'S BEGINNINGS
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. marketed Bendectin 14 from the late 1950s until 1983 when
Merrell withdrew it from the market. 15 When Betty Mekdeci's case against Merrell
went to trial, Merrell's dearth of safety research and apparent efforts to either ignore or
misrepresent the warning signs of Bendectin's possible teratogenicity1 6 disturbed the
jury. 17 Despite the Bendectin plaintiffs increasing problems in proving causation, the
jury appeared to focus on Merrell's negligent behavior and returned a verdict for the
plaintiff.'8 Several of the other initial Bendectin juries followed suit,' 9 contributing to
an "exponential growth" in Bendectin litigation.20 The rapidly increasing litigation and
accompanying media coverage encouraged scientists unconnected to the litigation to
produce further Bendectin research.2' Subsequently, numerous published
epidemiological studies demonstrated that taking Bendectin during pregnancy did not
"appreciably increase" the risk of birth defects.22 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and its Canadian counterpart, Health Canada, also concluded that there was no
14. Bendectin is a combination of three ingredients, all of which remain on the market and
are generally recognized as being safe. Specifically, Bendectin was the combination of
dicyclomine hydrochloride (an antispasmodic, formerly marketed under the name Bentyl),
doxylamine succinate (an antinauseant, marketed currently in many over-the-counter products,
including Unisom, a sleep aid), and pyridoxine hydrochloride (vitamin B-6). SANDERS, supra
note 1, at 1.
15. Lasagna & Shulman, supra note 5, at 101; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 5;
TRIALLAWYERSINC.COM, SAYING No To DRUGS 7 (2005), http://www.triallawyersinc.
com/healthcare/hc03.html. Bendectin's manufacturer pulled the drug "in the face of$18 million
in annual legal bills-against only $20 million in total sales," despite the over thirty published
studies failing to find a link between Bendectin and birth defects. See id.
16. What research Merrell had performed was tainted by "a series of questionable
decisions" regarding Bendectin's safety testing and the reporting of those test results to the FDA
and members of the medical profession. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
17. See id. at 12-13. In the first Bendectin case, the jury found that the defendant breached
no duty, but should pay the plaintiff anyway because of the plaintiffs injury. The jury discussed
a small damage award in order to "send a message" to the defendants because of their poor and
misleading research. Id.
18. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335,
338 (1999).
19. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 15.
20. Finley, supra note 18, at 338.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 339; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 61-87; see also Allen A. Mitchell, Pamela J.
Schwingl, Lynn Rosenberg, Carol Louik & Samuel Shapiro, Birth Defects in Relation to
Bendectin Use in Pregnancy: II. Pyloric Stenosis, 147 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 737
(1983) (supporting the safety of Bendectin in relation to the risk of pyloric stenosis); Joseph
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1993); Sally Zierler & Kenneth J. Rothman, Congenital Heart Disease in
Relation to Maternal Use of Bendectin and Other Drugs in Early Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 347 (1985) (finding only a weak association between Bendectin and birth defects). For
more on determining toxic causation, see GREEN, supra note 5, at 26-34.
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link between Bendectin and birth defects. 23 Canada still markets Bendectin as an
antinauseant for morning sickness.
24
Regardless of the mounting evidence in Merrell's favor on causation, the Bendectin
plaintiffs found experts who conducted unpublished re-analyses of the existing studies.
Although these experts concluded that Bendectin more than doubled the risk of birth
defects, their conclusions remained a minority opinion in both scientific and legal
circles. Yet, juries continued to find in favor of the Bendectin plaintiffs. One jury
awarded $19.2 million to a thirteen-year-old boy born with club feet after his mother
ingested Bendectin.26 Another jury assessed $20 million in compensatory and $75
million in punitive damages in a single Bendectin case.27
Due to the continuing and apparently misguided jury sympathy for plaintiffs, many
courts refused to admit any plaintiffs' expert's opinions that attempted to show a causal
inference based on anything but "statistically significant, peer reviewed, published
epidemiological studies that showed a relative risk above the background risk of two or
greater." 28 In other words, the courts required the plaintiffs to present epidemiological
evidence concluding that defendant's product, rather than background risks or
unexplained causes, was at least fifty percent likely to have caused any particular case
of the disease.29
The Daubert trial court was no exception. 30 On appeal from the Daubert trial court,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit supported the district court's stringent
23. See generally Sanders, supra note 22, at 10 (explaining that it is implausible to think
that the FDA would allow sales of doxylamine succinate, the most suspect ingredient in
Bendectin, if it thought doxylamine succinate was teratogenic).
24. "In Canada, Bendectin is known as Diclectin and is manufactured and sold by
Laboratoire Duchesnay, located in Laval, Quebec." Id. at 10 n.30.
25. Finley, supra note 18, at 339. Verdicts for Bendectin plaintiffs were "regarded as
aberrational by many members of the scientific community, the defense bar, some trial judges,
and virtually all appellate courts reviewing Bendectin cases." Id. In response, many judges
issued judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649
F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986). Others ruled that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to meet
their burden of proof. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir.
1989) (expecting the decision to "encourag[e] district judges faced with medical and
epidemiologic proof in subsequent toxic tort cases to be especially vigilant in scrutinizing the
basis, reasoning, and conclusiveness of studies presented by both sides").
26. Linda Lloyd, $19 Million AwardAgainst Drug Firm, THE PHILADELPInA INQUIRER, Feb.
2, 1987, available at http://www.klinespecter.com/news blumpi020287.html.
27. Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to
Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs off
the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 413, 428 (1990); see also Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., No. 83-3504 (D.D. C. Oct. 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (upholding the $20
million compensatory award, but granting a remittur on the award of $75 million in punitive
damages based on insufficient evidence of malice), rev'd, 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
28. Finley, supra note 18, at 339; see, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857
F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's chemical, in vitro, and in vivo studies
"are not capable of proving causation in human beings in the face of the overwhelming body of
contradictory epidemiological evidence" presented by defendant); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs.,
830 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (1st Cir. 1987); Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1160.
29. Finley, supra note 18, at 349-50.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
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criteria, invoking a respected prior case: Frye v. United States.31 Frye, a widely
accepted 32 D.C. Court of Appeals case, held that an admissible scientific opinion must
be "generally accepted" within the scientific community.33 By definition, opinions
contrary to the weight of a growing body of studies could not satisfy the Frye
standard.34 Frye also maintained that peer review and publication are essential to an
opinion's general acceptance.35 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
unpublished-and therefore unreviewed-controversial expert testimony on causation
36was inadmissible since it did not meet the threshold set by the trial court. Upon these
findings, the court of appeals dismissed the case.
37
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DAUBERTTRILOGY
Evidentially unsupported jury verdicts in the Bendectin litigation led to federal
courts' zealous efforts to exclude what was widely regarded as "junk science., 38
Growing concern about overly sympathetic juries prompted the Supreme Court to
review the standards for admitting scientific evidence. This Part follows the Supreme
Court's evolving articulation of the new federal standard through its decisions in
Daubert and General Electric Co. v. Joiner.39 The lower court judges' differing
interpretations of this standard has ultimately lead to discrepancies between federal and
state admission standards, which significantly impact diversity suits in the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits.
31. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Expert
opinion based on a scientific formula is admissible if it 'is generally accepted as a reliable
technique among the scientific community."' (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923)))
32. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1200-31(1980); Stan Kitzinger,
Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-Bye to Frye: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 58 ALB. L. REv. 575, 578-90 (1994).
33. Frye, 293 F. 1013. In Frye, a criminal defendant appealed from conviction based on a
rudimentary lie detector test. The court found that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has
not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made." Id. at 1014.
34. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
35. Id. at 1130-31.
36. Id. at 1131.
37. Id.
38. "Junk science" is a pejorative term used to deride specious scientific claims that are
made for monetary or political ends. Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and
Their Science is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability for Risk-
Producing Products andActivities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 897, 899-901 (2004). Peter Huber was
one of the first to use the term. See HUBER, supra note 5. Huber colorfully describes the term as
follows: "Courts resound with elaborate systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding
deceptions that fully deserve the contemptuous label used by trial lawyers themselves: junk
science. Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same form but none
of the same substance .... "Id. at 2.
39. 522 U.S. 136 (1997), rev'g Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11 th Cir. 1996).
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A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The Daubert plaintiffs appealed from the Ninth Circuit's unfavorable verdict,
claiming that the venerable Frye "general acceptance" rule was now outdated and was
superseded by the more inclusive-and potentially plaintiff-friendly-Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 ("Rule 702",).40 Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
4 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting its determination to whether Frye was
consistent with Rule 702.42
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the liberal standards of
Rule 702, rather than Frye, governed the admission of scientific expert testimony.43
Noting the Federal Rules' "permissive backdrop" and the fact that Rule 702 did not
specifically mention a "general acceptance" test, the Court found that the Rules did not
assimilate the Frye standard. 44 The Court then examined what limits the Rules placed
on the admissibility of scientific evidence. "[U]nder the Rules," the Court held, "the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable. '45 The Court explained the reliability standard first and then
discussed the relevance standard.
When determining the reliability of scientific evidence, the Supreme Court held that
the trial court should base its determination on scientific validity.46 Scientific expert
opinion testimony "requires a valid scientific connection" to the inquiry at bar. 47 The
Court stressed that the validity assessment was flexible, so judges should focus on the
experts' principles and methods, rather than on the experts' conclusions.48 The Court
analyzed Rule 702's language of "scientific .. .knowledge" to require that the
evidence was "ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science" and represented
more than a "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." 49 Though expert testimony
40. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
41. FED. R. EvID. 702.
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
43. Id. at 587.
44. Id. at 588-89.
45. Id. at 589.
46. Id. at 590. The Court noted that "scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does
the principle support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does the application of the
principle produce consistent results?)." Id. n.9. For the purposes of evidence admissibility, the
Court merged the two criteria. Id.
47. Id. at 592.
48. Id. at 594-95.
49. Id. at 590.
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did not have to achieve complete certainty, any assertion or inference must be
supported by "good grounds."
50
Rule 702 also requires that evidence or testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 51 This condition guided the
Court's standard of relevance; the judge must ascertain whether the fact-finder can
apply the testimony to the case's facts.5 2 Although the Court did not set out a
"definitive checklist," it mentioned four key factors.53 First, a court must determine
whether the theory is testable, and if so, whether it has been tested. Second, a court
should also take into account whether the study or theory has been peer-reviewed or
published. 4 Third, when an expert testifies about a specific technique, a court should
consider the technique's "known or potential rate of error."5 5 Fourth, in a nod to the
Frye standard, the trial court can consider whether the scientific community has
generally accepted the theory or technique. 56 In reversing the Ninth Circuit's use of the
Frye "general acceptance" standard, the Daubert Court charged trial judges with a
more active role in evidence admission. Federal trial judges must flexibly ascertain
whether proffered expert scientific testimony is both valid and relevant to the inquiry at
bar.
57
50. Id. at 589-90.
51. FED. R. EviD. 702.
52. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
53. Id. at 593.
54. Id. at 593-94. The Court noted:
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of
admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability ... and in some
instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published ....
Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest
to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a
component of "good science," in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 594.
56. Id. "Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within
the community,' .. . may properly be viewed with skepticism." Id. (quoting United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
57. Daubert was remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit "for further
proceedings consistent" with the Court's opinion. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598. The Ninth Circuit
did not further remand the case to the district court despite the plaintiff's request. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit held that "justice and judicial economy" would be better served by deciding the
issues at the appellate level. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995). The district court had already made an admissibility
decision and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Since a summary judgment
grant may be sustained on any basis supported by the record, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the district court's grant of summary judgment could be sustained under the new
standard. Id. After carefully examining the case in light of the new standard put forth by the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at
1322. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 516 U.S. 869
(1995).
2007]
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B. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
The Supreme Court's Daubert opinion reads like a pro-plaintiff ruling. In fact,
many commentators expected Daubert to open the floodgates to new and controversial
expert testimony for plaintiffs; 58 however, this prediction did not come true.
Subsequent cases following Daubert actually excluded more of plaintiffs' proposed
experts when plaintiffs argued new or controversial scientific theories.59 The exclusion
occurred not because of Daubert's substantive standard, but instead because of the
strong gatekeeping function it established for the district courts. In effect, Daubert
empowered district judges to make their own judgments about the validity of scientific
evidence.
Shortly after Daubert, some circuits questioned the Supreme Court's statement that
admissibility determinations should be based solely on a court's assessment of an
expert's methods and principles, as opposed to the expert's conclusions.6' The Third
Circuit, for example, held that for courts to function as gatekeepers, judges must not
only evaluate methods but also ascertain whether the conclusions drawn by experts
from their methodology are scientifically supportable. 61 Other circuits maintained the
distinction between the evidence's admissibility and the weight to be assigned to it by
the trier of fact.62
The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, provided an example of the latter: a circuit
adhering to Daubert's focus on methods, instead of conclusions. The Supreme Court
addressed the method versus conclusion divide among the circuits in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner.63 In Joiner, a case on appeal from the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff,
Robert Joiner, alleged that his workplace exposure to PCBs "promoted" his stem cell
lung cancer. But for his exposure, Joiner claimed, he would not have developed the
cancer for years, if at all.64 The district court excluded the plaintiff's experts because
58. See, e.g., Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science,
15 CARDozo L. REv. 1945 (1994).
59. Finley, supra note 18, at 341 (describing the "post-Daubert era" as a period of "'strict
scrutiny' of science by non-scientifically trained judges").
60. Id. at 342.
61. The Third Circuit justified its decision as follows:
[A]fter Daubert, we no longer think that the distinction between a methodology
and its application is viable. To begin with, it is extremely elusive to attempt to
ascertain which of an expert's steps constitute parts of a "basic" methodology and
which constitute changes from that methodology. If a laboratory consistently fails
to use certain quality controls so that its results are rendered unreliable, attempting
to ascertain whether the lack of quality controls constitutes a failure of
methodology or a failure of application of methodology may be an exercise in
metaphysics. Moreover, any misapplication of a methodology that is significant
enough to render it unreliable is likely to also be significant enough to skew the
methodology.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745-46 (3d Cir. 1994).
62. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
64. Id. at 139-40.
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the court "drew different conclusions from the research than did each of the experts." 65
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision to exclude the opinions of
plaintiff's experts, reasoning that the trial court had improperly conducted an analysis
of the experts' conclusions rather than the experts' methods.
66
When General Electric appealed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court endorsed the Third Circuit's competing view that "a court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered., 67 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion stated the two value choices
underlying Joiner.68 First, Justice Breyer emphasized the need for judges, notjuries, to
make their own judgments about an expert's conclusions in uncertain or "tentative"
areas of science. 69 Second, Justice Breyer urged caution with respect to the tort system,
explaining:
[M]odern life, including good health as well as economic well-being, depends on
the use of artificial or manufactured substances, such as chemicals. And it may...
prove particularly important to see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping
function, so that they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability...
points toward the right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones.
70
Thus, Daubert and Joiner established a clear set of policy choices. First, judges
should be trusted more than juries.71 Second, in light of the technology's benefits,
courts should err on the side of conservative scientific principles when deciding
whether to admit or reject expert evidence. 72 Finally, the decisions of the trial court-at
least when plaintiffs' experts are at issue-are to be afforded great deference.
65. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 533 (11 th Cir. 1996).
66. Id. at 529-30. The Eleventh Circuit wrote:
This gatekeeping role is simply to guard the jury from considering as proof pure
speculation presented in the guise of legitimate scientifically-based expert opinion.
It is not intended to turn judges into jurors or surrogate scientists. Thus, the
gatekeeping responsibility of the trial courts is not to weigh or choose between
conflicting scientific opinions, or to analyze and study the science in question in
order to reach its own scientific conclusions from the material in the field. Rather,
it is to assure that an expert's opinions are based on relevant scientific methods,
processes, and data, and not on mere speculation, and that they apply to the facts
in issue.
Id. at 530.
67. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144-46.
68. Id. at 147-50. Part III will discuss the rigorous standards subsequently applied in the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Parts III and IV will establish that policy choices like Justice
Breyer's are at work in those circuits' decisions.
69. Id. at 147-48 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's concurrence contrasts with
Justice Stevens's partial dissent, which argues that Joiner usurps the traditional role of the jury
to assess the strength of an expert's conclusions. Id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 148-49 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71. Finley, supra note 18, at 345.
72. Id.
2007]
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III. APPLYING DAUBERT
After the Supreme Court's charge in Daubert and Joiner, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits developed particularly rigorous rules on evidence admissibility. In several
instances, however, state courts falling within these federal districts put forth
substantially more lenient admissibility standards. As will be more fully developed
later in this Note, the rift between strict federal standards and moderate state standards
creates a serious Erie problem for federal courts hearing diversity cases.73
A. Diverging Standards for Admitting Epidemiological Studies
The Daubert Court held that admitted scientific evidence must be "reliable. 74
Therefore, citing the reliability criterion from Daubert, courts often create a
"hierarchy" with regard to potentially causation-proving evidence. 75 Epidemiology is
the only type of science that studies causal associations in human populations,76 which
means that epidemiological evidence is the most adept at proving causation in
humans.77 Thus, epidemiological evidence achieves the highest rank in the hierarchy.
73. See infra Parts IV, V. Many authors have also expressed concerns that the federal
evidence standard goes against contemporary scientific standards, prompting some to worry that
many deserving plaintiffs are denied their day in court. See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary
Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
401, 414-15 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000), available at http://puri.access.gpo.gov/
GPO/LPS19667 (concluding that the Court's narrow focus on epidemiology goes against
contemporary scientific understanding); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between
Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic
Tort Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 289, 303-05 (agreeing with
Goldstein's conclusion and further arguing that the focus goes against the Supreme Court's
ruling in Joiner); Finley, supra note 18, at 349-50 (noting that the federal standard improperly
conflates the admissibility of the evidence with the question of whether the evidence by itself
meets plaintiff's burden of proof); Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology,
Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321, 325 (2000) (explaining that
the Court's "doubling of the risk" standard improperly assumes that background risks can be
calculated separately from the risk the defendant's product creates); Thomas 0. McGarity, On
the Prospect of "Daubertizing'" Judicial Review ofRisk Assessment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 2003, at 155, 172-73 (pointing out various flaws in the federal court sanctioned
"corpuscular approach" to evaluating expert conclusions); Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity,
Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1416-17 (1994)(arguing
for a weight-of-the-evidence standard, rather than the Court's currently favored approach);
Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301, 321-28 (1992) [hereinafter Sanders, Bendectin Litigation] (worrying that, in
the absence of trial publicity, scientists might not get funding to research a drug-thus failing to
generate the needed epidemiological studies for plaintiffs to win their case).
74. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
75. Berger, supra note 73, at 302.
76. See SANDERS, supra note 1, at 47 ("Epidemiological studies on the teratogenic effects of
drugs compare the incidence of birth defects among those exposed and those not exposed to a
drug.").
77. Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005). See also In re
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (stating that "epidemiological
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Other studies, and particularly studies on animals, are of lower value, especially when
contrary epidemiological evidence exists. 78 Other courts go further, holding that the
only admissible expert opinions are those based on epidemiological evidence. These
courts reason that scientifically valid types of evidence, like in vitro studies, 79 animal
studies, 0 chemical structure analyses, 8' and clinical experience or case studies are not
legally relevant unless they are supported by epidemiological studies.8 2
Submission of epidemiological evidence alone, however, is not always enough for
plaintiffs to prevail on summary judgment. If an epidemiological study shows a
doubling of risk when a human is exposed to the defendant's product (i.e., a relative
risk of 2.0), then the study concludes that there are twice as many cases of the disease
in people exposed to the defendant's product as there are in people who are not
exposed to the defendant's product.8 3 Therefore, the study finds that it is fifty percent
likely that any particular case of a disease is attributable to the defendant's product,
studies are necessary to determine the cause and effect between breast implants and allegedly
associated diseases"); LINDA A. BAILEY, LEON GORDIS, MICHAEL GREEN & PAUL ROTHSTEIN,
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121, 126
(1994) ("In the absence of an understanding of the biological and pathological mechanisms by
which disease develops, epidemiological evidence is the most valid type of scientific evidence
of toxic causation.").
78. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,1231,1237,1241
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. "In vitro studies test teratogenicity by exposing single cells, organs, culture-maintained
embryos, or limb buds to a suspect substance and examining the biochemical events .... [B]y
using animal and human cell cultures, in vitro studies allow direct comparisons across species of
the effects of cell and organ exposure to drugs." SANDERS, supra note 1, at 46 (citation omitted).
80. Animal studies, sometimes called in vivo studies, study a drug's effects on an animal
species thought to exhibit a reaction to the drug close to that of a human. No one particular
laboratory animal is the best prognosticator of human reaction to teratogenicity. Id. at 47. Courts
often reject animal studies without accompanying epidemiological data since animal studies
require "extrapolation from animals to humans" and from higher doses to lower doses. Berger,
supra note 73, at 302; see, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., I I F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (finding that
since breast cancer occurs in nonimplanted women and implanted women, "epidemiological
studies are necessary to determine the cause and effect between breast implants and allegedly
associated diseases"); Tyler ex rel. Tyler v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (N.D.
Okla. 1998) (excluding expert's use of animal studies because "test results on animals are not
necessarily reliable evidence of the same reaction in humans"); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1410 (D. Or. 1996) (rejecting expert testimony based on extrapolations from
animal studies because plaintiff did not show that the results of those studies could be applied to
humans); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 199-202 (Tex. App.
1998) (rejecting animal studies, case studies, and clinical experience as unlikely to support a
finding of causation).
81. In chemical structure-activity analyses, scientists draw inferences about the biological
activity of a drug through an examination of the drug's chemical structure, followed by a
comparison of that structure to the structure of drugs whose biological activities are well
documented. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 46.
82. Finley, supra note 18, at 350; Rider v. Sandoz, 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1 th Cir. 2002)
(preferring "peer-reviewed epidemiological literature, a predictable chemical mechanism,
general acceptance in learned treastises, or a very large number of case reports").
83. Finley, supra note 18, at 349 n.49; BAILEY, ET AL., supra note 75, at 168-69.
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rather than background risk or "unexplained causes." 84 The Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits, for example, have requirements over and above the mere tendering of
epidemiological data. The Eleventh Circuit requires presentation of epidemiological
evidence that shows at least a doubling of relative risk. The Ninth Circuit similarly
requires that admissible epidemiological evidence display a doubling of the plaintiff's
risk, unless the substance at issue is generally understood to cause harm86 or the
plaintiff proves that her personal susceptibility is greater than the average.
87
1. State Standards in the Eleventh Circuit
Some state courts within the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, however, provide more
moderate rules for evidence admission. For example, Florida state courts, which are in
the Eleventh Circuit, allow plaintiffs to submit epidemiological evidence that does not
meet the 2.0 threshold of relative risk. Plaintiffs must merely show "association" and
not "causation."8 8 The Berry court wrote that it would not "seize on the putative flaws
of studies favorable to plaintiff, and then. . . privilege certain studies favorable to the
defendant." 89 Doing so would "impermissibly... place a thumb on defendant's side of
the scale" and encroach on the jury's prerogative to weigh both sides of the case. 90
Florida federal district courts, on the other hand, require a 2.0 showing. In Barrow
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, a Florida federal district court held that, without "statistically
significant" epidemiological data (i.e., data showing a doubling of the relative risk), the
plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof.9' Tellingly, the district court recognized the
"unfairness" its decision propagated, even as it explained its duty to follow precedent.
92
The district court worried that the current law placed the burden of proof on the person
least likely to have the "financial means or scientific knowledge to conduct
epidemiological studies., 93 The district court's concerns are similar to those held by
84. Finley, supra note 18, at 349-50; see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 647 (1992).
85. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The
threshold for concluding that an agent more likely than not caused a disease is 2.0."); Magistrini
v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002); In re Breast
Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. 950 F.
Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that since plaintiff's probability estimate was "not
founded upon epidemiological studies showing a relative risk of greater than two," it did not
establish "'a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry"' (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
86. In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002).
87. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
88. Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 567-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
89. Id. at 571.
90. Id. (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1135 (2d Cir.
1995)).
91. Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 96-689-CIV-ORL-19B, 1998 WL 812318, at
*23 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998).
92. Id. at *38.
93. Id. at *37. Furthermore, this rule created a transparency paradox. The fewer tests
conducted by a defendant, the less likely that plaintiffs could prove adverse effects stemming
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Florida's state courts, but the Florida state courts were able to promulgate a more
lenient evidentiary standard. 94
2. State Standards in the Ninth Circuit
Arizona state courts do not require a 2.0 threshold for admissible epidemiological
evidence.95 Citing the state's goal of balancing fairness with efficiency, 96 one Arizona
state court explained that Arizona did not mandate an "arbitrary" 2.0 threshold.97 But
Arizona federal district courts, located in the Ninth Circuit, are considerably stricter. In
Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, for example, an Arizona federal district court applying
Arizona law to a diversity case held that "studies showing a relative risk less than 2.0
would not be helpful, and indeed would only serve to confuse the jury, if offered to
prove rather than refute causation.
98
The Ninth Circuit has also refused to adopt state standards in cases coming from
Washington and Idaho. Washington courts do not require any epidemiological
evidence at all because they are concerned that a stricter requirement coupled with a
dearth of studies linking the disease to the hazard would force the first victims of any
newly recognized occupational disorder to go uncompensated. 99 Nonetheless, in two
from the defendant's product. "The law thus encourages corporations to act irresponsibly in
failing to develop and disclose information relating to potential harms caused by defects in their
products." Id. at *37-38. For more on transparency paradoxes, see generally Daniel R. Cahoy,
Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming Summer 2007).
94. A number of cases establish the difference in evidentiary standards between Florida
state courts and Eleventh Circuit federal courts. Compare Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1270-72 (Fla. 2003) (accepting controversial epidemiological data,
differential diagnosis, and "pioneering" in vitro studies; affirming that the evaluation of an
expert's conclusions are the proper issue for a trier of fact, not ajudge), and U.S. Sugar Corp.
v. Henson, 787 So. 2d 3, 17-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing plaintiff to continue,
despite a lack of epidemiological evidence, only because plaintiff's expert's testimony was
based on "widely-accepted scientific texts and other accepted.., literature"), with Bushore v.
Dow Coming-Wright Corp., No. 92-344-Civ-T-26C, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, at *9-15
(D. Fla. Nov. 15, 1999) (rejecting the expert's new theory, even though the theory was
supported by several peer-reviewed, published studies because the expert "has yet to publish a
peer-reviewed epidemiological study," the expert's own studies are subject to error, and several
other authors disagree with the expert's conclusions).
95. Lofgren v. Motorola, Inc., No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *14 (Ariz. Super.
June 1, 1998) (requiring only a "significant increase in the probability of the relative risk of the
disease to an exposed group similar to that experienced by the plaintiffs").
96. Id. at *9.
97. Id. at* 14.
98. 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000).
99. See Bowman v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 30824-0-I1, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS
2843, at *13-14 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004) ("'[I]f this court were to accept [the
employer's] argument, the first victims of any newly recognized occupational disease would
always go uncompensated."' (quoting Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 833
P.2d 390, 399 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992))); Intalco, 833 P.2d at 399 ("The absence of studies
linking aluminum plant pot room exposure to neurologic disease does not compel the
conclusion that the claimants failed to make a showing of.. . cause. ... The claimants should
not be denied benefits simply because Drs. Longstreth and Rosenstock were the first physicians
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cases originating from Washington federal district courts, the Ninth Circuit established
that it requires an epidemiological study showing a doubling of the risk, unless the
substance at issue is known to cause harm10 0 or the plaintiff somehow establishes that
her individual susceptibility is greater than average.' 0'
Similarly, Idaho courts allow plaintiffs to prove their cases using "tissue samples,
standard tests, and [the results of] patient examination[s], provided the plaintiffs'
experts' methods are sound."' 0 2 A state court explained that Idaho law ought not
"preclude recovery until a 'statistically significant' number of people have been injured
or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory
studies of the chemical."'1 3 This focus on methods, as opposed to conclusions, goes
against the federal standard articulated by judges who scrutinize an expert's methods
and conclusions. 104 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, issues a blanket requirement that
epidemiological studies show a doubling of the risk, unless the substance at issue is
known to cause harm'0 5 or the plaintiff establishes that her individual susceptibility is
greater than average. 16 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's standard clashes with Idaho's
refusal to require epidemiological data to bolster nonepidemiological evidence.
B. Diverging Standards for the Admissibility of Other Scientific Evidence
State and federal courts disagree about more than just epidemiological standards.
Federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit put forth stronger standards than the circuit's
corresponding state courts with respect to both experts' qualifications and the
admissibility of non-epidemiological evidence such as animal studies and challenge
test results.10 7 The Ninth Circuit diverges from its corresponding state courts in its
treatment of evidence that is based primarily on clinical or practical experience.
to systematically study the effects of toxic pot room exposures on the central nervous system of
humans.").
100. In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002).
101. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
102. Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725,733 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Ferebeev. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
103. Earl, 772 P.2d at 733 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536).
104. See supra Part II.
105. InreBerg, 293 F.3dat 1129.
106. In re Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1137. See also Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 737
F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (D. Idaho 1990) ("These three types of studies then-chemical, in vitro
[test tube], and in vivo [animal]--cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that
Bendectin caused the birth defects at issue in this case. Studies of this kind... are not capable
of proving causation in human beings" when substantive epidemiological evidence exists to the
contrary. (alterations in original) (quoting Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159,
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
107. Challenge testing exposes the individual to a substance that the doctor suspects is
making her sick. The purpose is to gather evidence linking the patient's symptoms to the
patient's exposure to the challenged substance. Marc Treadwell, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
55 MERCER L. REv. 249,260 (2003).
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1. State Standards in the Eleventh Circuit
Alabama state courts, located in the Eleventh Circuit, put forth comparatively
relaxed evidentiary standards governing the admissibility of nonepidemiological
evidence and expert qualifications. In Cooper v. Diversey Corporation, an Alabama
appellate court admitted an expert's opinion on the toxicity of silicate compounds
found in industrial laundry detergent even though: (1) his opinion relied only upon
research and studies conducted on the medical problems resulting from silicone breast
implants; and (2) he produced no studies showing that the silicate compounds in the
laundry detergent caused similar ailments in persons other than the plaintiff.'08 In
Tidwell v. Upjohn Co., the Alabama Supreme Court allowed a pharmacologist's expert
testimony on causation, even though causation was admittedly far outside his area of
expertise.' 9 But in McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc., a case filed in
Alabama's federal district court, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected
a clinical medical doctor's expert testimony partly because he was not a researcher in
the field. "10 The court also rejected differential diagnosis' 1 and case studies."l2 Were
the McClain court to have applied Alabama's permissive common law standard under
Cooper and Tidwell, the above evidence likely would have been admitted as reliable
methods of establishing causation.
Likewise, the Georgia Court of Appeals has expressly declined to adopt the Daubert
standard."l 3 Accordingly, it allowed the admission of "challenge testing," despite the
fact that the testing was not "formalized" and possessed some methodological flaws."14
The court explained that problems with the method applied to the evidence's weight,
rather than its admissibility." 5 Still, in recent cases originating in Georgia federal
districts, the Eleventh Circuit rejects challenge testing evidence." 6
108. 742 So. 2d 1244, 1247-48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Ex
parte Diversey Corp., 742 So. 2d 1250, 1254-55 (Ala. 1999).
109. 626 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Ala. 1993) (finding that causation was related to "complex
issues of psychopharmacology, pharmokinetics, epidemiology, and psychiatry") (emphasis
omitted).
110. 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("Dr. Hakim is a medical doctor specializing in
the practice of neurology; he is a clinician and not a medical researcher.... [His] opinions lack
sufficient reliability to satisfy Daubert.").
111. Differential diagnosis is "the distinguishing between two or more diseases with similar
symptoms by systematically comparing their signs and symptoms." MOSBY'S MEDICAL &
NURSING DICTIONARY 347 (Walter D. Glanze et al. eds., 2d ed. 1986).
112. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1252-54. But see Brasher v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 160 F. Supp.
2d 1291, 1297 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (allowing expert opinion based on differential diagnosis when
conducting an epidemiological study would be "dangerous and not in the best interests of the
people").
113. Bryant v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 729 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
114. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Carder, 575 S.E.2d 664, 667-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
115. Id. at669.
116. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1199-204 (1lth Cir. 2002) (rejecting
dechallenge/rechallenge evidence-which is another name for challenge testing).
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2. State Standards in the Ninth Circuit
Similar examples of disparate treatment in the state and federal courts exist in the
Ninth Circuit as well. In Logerquist v. McVey, for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that evidentiary standards applicable to novel scientific evidence should not apply
to an expert's testimony when that testimony is based on "experience, observation, and
study of literature." ' 1 7 When an expert bases her opinion on experience, the validity of
her argument should be tested by witness interrogation, rather than via an inquiry into
general acceptance.'18 However, in Cloud ex rel. Cloud v. Pfizer, Inc., an Arizona
federal district court rejected a psychiatrist's testimony that was based on several
articles, his thirty-three years of experience as a psychiatrist, and his research in
conducting clinical trials of the drug at issue.' 19 In explaining its decision, the court
implicitly rejected Arizona's common law standard under Logerquist, writing that the
expert's "conclusions are not supported by the . . . literature or any admissible
evidence."
120
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' rules require that plaintiffs benefit from
considerable knowledge about the disorder at issue. The general rule requiring a 2.0
showing in epidemiological studies, for instance, mandates that either current plaintiffs
or previous plaintiffs spend a great deal of time and money proving causation.' 2' The
Ninth Circuit does provide two exceptions to its 2.0 rule: the 2.0 showing is not
required (1) when the substance is generally known to be harmful, or (2) when the
plaintiff can establish that her individual susceptibility is higher than normal. But even
plaintiffs covered under the Ninth Circuit's exceptions must expend resources or
benefit from a previous plaintiff's expenditure of considerable resources. For a
substance to be generally recognized as harmful, the substance would have needed to
cause well-publicized problems for a significant amount of time.
Similarly, if plaintiffs wish to establish a greater-than-average individual
susceptibility, they must first show what an average susceptibility to the substance is-
which, again, requires expenditures of time and money. By rejecting less expensive
evidence, such as animal studies or challenge testing, these federal courts place an
extremely difficult burden on poor-and even affluent-plaintiffs who are the first to
learn of a causal link between a product and an injury or disease. Public safety
concerns for such plaintiffs likely contributed to the more lenient evidentiary criteria
117. 1 P.3d 113, 122 (Ariz. 2000).
118. Id. at 133.
119. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131-34 (D. Ariz. 2001).
120. Id. at 1132.
121. GOLDsTEIN & HENuqN, supra note 73, at 414. Consequently, scientists are often
unwilling or unable to conduct third-party epidemiological studies in the absence of litigation or
a public health concern. This creates a no-win situation for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs need
epidemiological data in order to litigate, but epidemiological studies are not often performed
without there first being litigation. As a result, a requirement of exclusive or extensive reliance
on epidemiological data is controversial. Berger, supra note 73, at 303; see also Sanders,
Bendectin Litigation, supra note 71, at 321-28. These authors explain that in the absence of
some sort of publicity, scientists may be unable to obtain funding. This Note adds that some
scientists may not see the need for research in the absence of controversy about the drug in
question.
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put forth in Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Arizona, Washington, and Idaho. The federal
courts, in refusing to apply these state standards, provide diverse defendants with an
unfair advantage over forum-state plaintiffs-an advantage that courts in the states
intentionally disallowed.
IV. ERIE ANALYSIS
As explained in Part III, at least six state courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have propounded a more lenient standard of evidence admissibility than their federal
counterparts. Their standards are likely driven by worries that the indigent plaintiffs or
the first plaintiffs to contract a disease may not have the resources to bridge the
causation gap.' 22 The Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Arizona, Washington, and Idaho
state courts place a priority on public safety over technological development. The
federal courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, however, err on the side of scientific
caution, possibly guided by concerns that productive defendants like the Bendectin
manufacturers might be subject to unwarranted tort liability. Thus, under Justice
Breyer's rationale in Joiner, the federal circuits reverse the states' priorities and
privilege technological development over public safety.1
23
The federal circuits' more rigorous admissibility standards often produce outcomes
more favorable to defendants. 24 By requiring a more difficult evidentiary threshold for
plaintiffs, the federal courts are more likely to dismiss plaintiffs' cases on summary
judgment. As a result, the federal standard encourages forum shopping by defendants
brought to trial in forum states that have a more lenient evidentiary standard. Since out-
of-state defendants can remove to federal jurisdiction,125such defendants are more
likely to do so since they know that plaintiffs will face a greater evidentiary burden in
122. As even the Ninth Circuit admits, "[a]n average plaintiff alleging a connection between
latent disease and exposure to hazardous substances does not have the means to conduct the type
of... epidemiological study necessary to bridge the causation gap." O'Connor v. Boeing N.
Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). To that end, one state court wrote that products
liability law "does not preclude recovery until a 'statistically significant' number of people have
been injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory
studies of the chemical." Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 733 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Another court
concluded that plaintiffs should not have to wait for "'general acceptance' . . . of... systemic
harm as a condition to... proceeding" with a claim. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98,
124 n. 1 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled in part
by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (Nev. 2001). A third state worries that if courts were to
accept a more stringent standard, "the first victims of any newly recognized... disease would
always go uncompensated." Bowman v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 30824-0-II, 2004 Wash.
App. LEXIS 2843, at * 13-14 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004) (quoting Intalco Aluminum Corp.
v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 833 P.2d 390, 399 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)).
123. See supra text accompanying note 70.
124. Berger, supra note 73, at 316-17 ("When a court excludes the plaintiff's proffered
expert testimony on the basis of a policy-based rule and then grants summary judgment, the
result is outcome determinative.").
125. All defendants may remove any civil case to federal court if the case could have been
originally brought in federal court. Diversity is one such ground for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(2000).
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federal court than in state court. This forum shopping enables defendants to elude the
consequences of state standards.126 The dramatic outcome differences between federal
circuit courts and the state courts within those federal circuits provoke Erie concerns of
federalism and state comity. Though Erie doctrine is unsettled at present, 27 the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits' applications of the Daubert trilogy constitute an Erie violation,
regardless of whether the situation is considered under the standard set out in any of
the Supreme Court's potentially viable Erie tests.
A. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins first recognized that federal courts must apply state
substantive law in diversity cases.' 28 A passing freight train injured plaintiff Tompkins
while he was walking along the railroad's right-of-way in Hughestown,
Pennsylvania. 129 The case centered on the standard of duty that the railroad owed
Tompkins. The defendant argued that its duty was "no greater than that owed to a
trespasser" under Pennsylvania common law.' 30 The plaintiff, however, contended that
since there was no state statute on that subject, the railroad's duty and liability should
be determined in the federal courts according to the holding in Swift v. Tyson.'3 '
In finding for the defendant and overruling Swift, the Erie Court established that
federal courts do not have a lawmaking function in areas of substantive law reserved to
the states. 132 In Erie cases, the federal court sitting in diversity must determine whether
the state practice at issue is sufficiently "substantive" as to raise an Erie issue-
meaning state law applies-or whether the federal court is instead free to follow its
own procedures.' 33 Subsequent cases substantially expanded and modified Erie's
original holding.
126. State standards tend to be more democratic than federal standards because state judges
are more likely to be elected. Pasquale A. Cipollone, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
Judicial Elections: Application and Remedy, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 760 (1991) ("The
democratic pedigree of elected judges is purer than that of appointed judges in the sense that the
former are selected directly by the people, rather than indirectly by executives or legislators
representing the people.").
127. See infra Part IV.D, explaining the confusion engendered by Justice Ginsberg's
majority opinion in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
128. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129. Id. at 69.
130. Id. at 70.
131. Id. at 70-71 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842)).
132. Berger, supra note 73, at 310.
133. Id. But there is some disagreement about whether an Erie analysis should be applied to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court has never applied an Erie analysis to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Robin Kundis Craig, When Daubert Gets Erie: Medical Certainty
and Medical Expert Testimony in Federal Court, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 69, 80-81 (1999). Most
circuits that have addressed the application of Erie to the Federal Rules of Evidence agree that
"there are some State evidentiary rules so bound up with the substantive law of the State that a
federal court sitting in that State should accord it the same treatment as the State courts in order
to give effect to the State's substantive policy." Stonehocker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 587 F.2d
151, 155 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Conway v. Chemical-Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837
(5th Cir. 1976)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1995);
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B. Hanna v. Plumer
Hanna v. Plumer was the first case to expand on the Erie doctrine. 3 4 In Hanna,
service of a tort complaint was made to a decedent's estate by leaving copies of the
complaint with the defendant executor's wife.135 This procedure complied with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), but did not comply with the "in hand" method
prescribed by Massachusetts law.13 6 Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion held that
service should be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather
than the state rules of civil procedure because holding otherwise would
"disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or
Congress'[s] attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act."',
37
The Hanna court established that an Erie analysis has two parts. First, if the Federal
Constitution or an act of Congress applies to the issue at bar, then federal judges must
follow the federal practice even if there is a contrary state rule.138 This result derives
from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution ' 9 and, in the case of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Enabling Act.' 40 This part of the Erie
analysis is sometimes known as the "Hanna prong."' 141 Second, if neither the
Constitution nor Congress has issued an applicable directive, the court makes its choice
of law under the Rules of Decision Act (RDA). 142 The RDA analysis "assesses whether
an issue involves a matter of substance (as to which state law must govern) or
procedure (as to which federal law may govern)."' 143 This is the RDA prong of the Erie
analysis.
Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995); Espeaignnette v. Gene Tiemey
Co., 43 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994); Washington v. Dep't of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir.
1993); Grossheim v. Freightliner Corp., 974 F.2d 745, 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Potts v. Benjamin,
882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989); Romine v. Paman, 831 F.2d 944, 944-45 (10th Cir.
1987). Since most circuits agree that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be treated similarly
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the purposes of Erie analysis, this Note will assume
that majority opinion. However, for a detailed analysis of both sides of this issue, see Craig,
supra, at 80-88.
134. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
135. Id. at 461.
136. Id. at 462.
137. Id. at 473-74.
138. Id. at 471. There are two exceptions: (1) if the federal practice "transgresses... the
terms of the Enabling Act," or (2) the federal practice runs afoul of the Constitution. Id.
139. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (providing that the Supreme Court has the power to "prescribe
general rules of practice[,] ... procedure[,] ... and evidence" in United States federal district
courts and that "all laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect").
141. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on Erie.After Gasperini, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1637, 1637
(1998).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
143. Freer, supra note 141, at 1637.
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C. RDA Analysis Tests
The Supreme Court propagated several tests for ascertaining whether an issue is
substantive or procedural under the RDA prong. These tests will be discussed in
chronological order. In cases decided in the 1940s and 1950s, the courts "ben[t] over
backward to find that state law governed.'" 44 The basis for these outcomes was
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 145 a 1945 case which established an outcome
determination test. 146 In Guaranty Trust, the Court asked whether, when a state statute
of limitations barred the action, "a federal court in equity [could] take cognizance of
the suit because there is diversity of citizenship between the parties.' 47 Disregarding
whether the question was one of substance or procedure, the Court held that since a
federal court sitting in diversity is "in effect, only another court of the State," the
federal court cannot allow recovery if the right to recover is unavailable under the
state's statute of limitations. 48 Under the rule established in Guaranty Trust, any state
practice was substantive if its application in federal court might produce a different
result than the Federal Rules.
49
The Court redesigned its analysis in 1958. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative, Inc., the Court adopted a three-part series of tests requiring courts to
consider factors other than strict outcome determination. 150 The court must first
ascertain the interests served by the competing state rule.' 5' Only if the state rule is not
clearly substantive, but appears to be merely procedural, can the court apply an
outcome determination test.' 52 The outcome determination test answers whether the
"federal court's refusal to apply the state rule" would decide the outcome of the case.
153
Finally, if such a refusal would be outcome determinative, then the court should apply
the state's practice-but only if the court finds no "affirmative countervailing
considerations" in favor of the federal practice.'
54
144. Id. at 1645.
145. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
146. Id. at 107. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, explained that Erie's essence was
the "requirement of vertical uniformity" between state court decisions and federal court
decisions. Berger, supra note 73, at 313 (explaining Guaranty Trust).
147. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 107.
148. Id. at 108-09.
149. Id. at 109.
150. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
151. Id. at 535-36. The court determines the weight of the state's interest by ascertaining
whether the state practice is "bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties" and consequently furthers a substantive state policy. Berger, supra note 73, at 315.
152. A procedural rule enforces merely "form and mode," rather than substantial state
policies. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
153. Freer, supra note 141, at 1648-49; see also Berger, supra note 73, at 314.
154. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38. The "affirmative countervailing considerations" requirement
introduced the famous "balancing" aspect of the Byrd test. Freer, supra note 141, at 1649-50.
The weight afforded to the federal practice depends on the role that the federal rule plays in the
federal system. The Byrd Court evinced concern that "[t]he policy of uniform enforcement of
state-created rights and obligations, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York ... cannot in every
case exact compliance with a state rule-not bound up with rights and obligations-which
disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury." Byrd, 356 U.S. at
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The Court applied this test in Byrd to hold that federal interests weighed in favor of
the federal practice of a jury trial. In Byrd, the Court had to ascertain whether a
plaintiff's status as an employee must be decided by a judge, in keeping with South
Carolina's common law,' 55 or by a jury, according to federal practice.156 After finding
the South Carolina common law at issue merely "administrative,"',5 7 the Court then
admitted that the difference between having a factual issue decided by ajudge versus a
jury might often be an outcome-determinative distinction.158 Yet, the Court found that
the federal court system's "distribution of functions" between the judge and jury is an
"essential characteristic" of that system.' 59 Since there is a strong federal policy in
favor of maintaining that distribution of functions, the Court allowed the plaintiffto try
his case before a jury, in contravention of the state practice. 60
In Hanna v. Plumer,161 the Court seemed to retreat from both the outcome
determination test and the Byrd balancing test by endorsing a modified outcome
determination test.' 62 The Hanna test suggested that courts should apply a state
procedure if the state procedure promotes Erie's "twin aims": avoidance of both forum
shopping and discrimination against citizens of the forum state.'
6 3
D. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
Gasperini is the most recent Erie case to come before the Supreme Court. 64
Gasperini held that a state practice contrary to the common law of federal procedure
must be applied when the state practice is substantive according to the court's RDA
analysis.' 65 In Gasperini, the district court entered judgment on a jury award of
$450,000. In New York, state appellate courts may review the size ofa jury verdict and
order a new trial when the jury's award "'deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation."1 66 Conversely, the federal standard allowed courts to grant
a new trial for excessiveness only when the award "shock[ed] the [court's]
conscience."
167
537-38 (footnote omitted). Thus, as Freer explains, "[tihe federal courts can, in essence, be
conscripted to help enforce a state policy, but not if doing so will harm the integrity of the
federal judicial system." Freer, supra note 141, at 1650.
155. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 571-72 (S.C. 1957).
156. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 533-34.
157. Id. at 535-36.
158. Id. at 537.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 538.
161. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
162. Berger, supra note 73, at 315-16.
163. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
164. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
165. Id. at 427-28.
166. Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y.C.P.LR. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)). "To determine whether
an award 'deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,' New York state
courts look to awards approved in similar cases." Id. at 425 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)
(McKinney 1995)).
167. Id. at 422-23. The difference in the standard's strictness is no accident. New York
"lawmakers found the 'shock the conscience' test an insufficient check on damage awards; the
legislature therefore installed a standard 'invit[ing] more careful appellate scrutiny."' Id. at 423
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In its RDA analysis, the Supreme Court first addressed whether the federal court's
application of the state standard was outcome effective; that is, whether such an
application provoked forum shopping or unfair discrimination against the citizens of
the forum state. 168 The Court reported that both parties agreed that the issue, a statutory
cap on damages, was substantive under Erie.16 9 Since the application of federal law
would produce "substantial" outcome variation from a court applying the state law, the
Court reasoned that the New York statute implicated the twin aims of Erie.170 Even if
the difference between state and federal standards leads to forum shopping and unfair
discrimination, courts must also consider the federal court system's "essential"
attributes. 171 The Court specified that one example of an important federal interest is
the preservation of traditional federal distributions oftrial functions between judge and
jury "under the influence... of the Seventh Amendment."'172
The Gasperini Court then noted that unlike the Byrd Court, it did not face a "one-
or-the-other choice.' ' 173 Instead, the Court found that both federal and state interests
could be accommodated via a compromise. Justice Ginsberg, writing for the Court,
held that the federal trial court must apply New York's "deviates materially"
standard. 174 Both practical considerations and the Seventh Amendment weighed in
favor of allocating this responsibility to the trial judge. 75 Still, in a nod to federal
concerns, the district court's application of the standard would be subject to review
under the usual federal abuse of discretion standard-the same standard currently used
for traditional federal appeals on the grounds of an excessive verdict.
76
In Gasperini, the Hanna twin aims test was not used to determine whether the state
practice was substantive; that determination appeared to have already been made using
common sense and the Guaranty Trust outcome determination test. 77 Instead, Hanna
was used as a separate factor in the analysis, perhaps even as an "afterthought.' 7 8 The
Byrd balancing test received a mention, but only after the state practice had been
declared substantive. Strikingly, the Court in Byrd had declared that a balancing of
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 428.
169. Id. at 428-29.
170. Id. at 430.
171. See id. at 431 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537
(1958)). To that end, the Court mentioned that the "outcome determination" test from Guaranty
Trust was "insufficient... in cases presenting countervailing federal interests." Id. at 432.
172. Id. at 432 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537). Under the Seventh Amendment's influence,
the federal courts assign decisions about disputed questions of fact to the jury. Id.
173. Id. at 436. In Byrd, the defendant either had to be tried by a judge or ajury. Therefore,
since the defendant could not be tried by both a judge and the jury or by some compromise of
the judge and the jury, the court faced a "one-or-the-other" choice: either the judge or the jury
must try the defendant.
174. Id. at 437.
175. Id. at 438. "Trial judges have the 'unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the
living courtroom context,' while appellate judges see only the 'cold paper record."' Id. (citations
omitted).
176. Id.
177. Freer, supra note 141, at 1654-55.
178. Id. at 1655.
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federal interests with state interests should occur only when the state practice had been
declared procedural. 179
Therefore, commentators and lower courts are uncertain about the weight afforded
to outcome determination, how the test proposed by Hanna fits into the Erie analysis,
and whether Byrd is good law.180 As explained in the following Part, however, it does
not matter which test (Byrd, Hanna, or Gasperini) is used to determine whether the
application of the Daubert trilogy violates the Erie line of cases. The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits' case law, when applied to diversity actions originating in the more
lenient state courts, violates every test the Supreme Court has put forth.18
V. APPLYING ERIE ANALYSIS TO THE DAUBERT TRILOGY
While there is much confusion about the state of the Erie doctrine, none of the
current Erie tests sanction the difference between federal and state common law as
discussed in Part III. A defendant's ability to avoid a state's constitutionally-enacted
standards by removing a case to federal court violates every principle implicit in the
original Erie decision.
A. The Hanna Prong Does Not Apply
The Hanna court held that if the Constitution or an act of Congress applies to the
issue at bar, then federal judges must follow the federal practice despite a contrary state
rule. 182 Thus, the Hanna prong might appear to apply to the federal common law of
evidence admission since Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of
evidence. Yet this conclusion misses an important distinction. The federal trial courts
move beyond the statutory rules of evidence in excluding epidemiological evidence
with a relative risk of less than 2.0 or in refusing to admit certain types of evidence
without epidemiological evidence. "Generalizations such as those are judge-made
procedural rules rather than rules adopted under the Rules Enabling Act or by
statute."'183 Therefore, the Hanna prong does not exempt the case law surrounding the
Daubert trilogy from scrutiny under Erie.
179. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958).
180. See, e.g., Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 69 Miss. L.J. 715, 716 (1999); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REv. 267, 290; Freer, supra note 141, at
1662--63; Eva Madison, The Supreme Court Sets New Standards of Review for Excessive
Verdicts in Federal Court in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 50 ARK. L. REv. 591,
602-03 (1997).
181. See Berger, supra note 73, at 313 (reaching a similar conclusion, but for different
reasons).
182. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-474 (1965).
183. Berger, supra note 73, at 311-12.
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B. The Byrd Test
In the first part of the Byrd test, the court determines the interests the competing
state rule serves.' 4 There is almost certainly a substantive state interest in regulating
the plaintiffs' evidence admission criteria because at least two policy judgments
influence a state's standards of evidence admission.' 85 First, the state procedure helps
to decide whether the tort system should place the onus for uncertainty about product
risks on the manufacturer or the purchaser. The state makes a choice between the
precautionary values protective of public health (pro-plaintiff) and the conservative
values of scientific proof (pro-defendant). 8 6 Second, through evidence admission
standards, states decide whether they trust judges more than juries to understand and
fairly apply an expert's conclusions. The states' conclusions were presumably based on
a reasoned analysis supported by the beliefs of the state's citizens. Both of these state
policies are "bound up in the rights and obligations of the parties."'187 Consequently, a
court applying Byrd to the federal common law would find a substantial state interest.
The court would not need to attempt the other portions of the tripartite Byrdtest.' 88 So,
under the original Byrd test, when the state expert evidence admission procedure
conflicts with federal practice, the state evidence procedure should govern in a federal
diversity case.
C. Hanna's Twin Aims Test
A Hanna analysis also concludes that certain federal circuits violate Erie by
applying the federal common law of evidence admission to diversity cases. Hanna's
dicta on the RDA suggested that a court should apply the state procedure over a
competing federal rule if the state procedure discourages forum shopping 8 9 and avoids
discrimination against the forum state's citizens. 190 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits'
interpretations of Daubert and Joiner actually encourage defendant forum shopping
because federal evidentiary standards disadvantage many forum-state plaintiffs. Upon
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, federal courts in those circuits dismiss
diversity cases that would have gone to trial at the state level.191 This harm to the
plaintiffs prompts the defendants to remove when the forum state employs a more
lenient standard than the federal common law. Additionally, plaintiffs in the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits who sue out-of-state defendants experience discrimination relative to
similarly located plaintiffs who sue forum-state defendants. When out-of-state
defendants remove, the stricter federal courts deny the plaintiffs recourse to the more
lenient state laws that plaintiffs suing forum-state defendants enjoy. Consequently,
184. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535-36 (1958); Berger, supra note 73, at 315.
185. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
186. Finley, supra note 18, at 336.
187. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535-36.
188. Id. at 536.
189. Or, equivalently, the federal procedure encourages forum shopping.
190. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).
191. Even though a grant of summaryjudgment is "outcome determinative" via the grant of
summary judgment to defendants, federal courts are privileged to use federal standards. Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
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under the original Hanna analysis, the federal standard for evidence admissibility
violates both of Erie's twin aims.
92
D. The Gasperini Test
Applying Gasperini to the evidence admissibility question would lead to the same
result, even though the Gasperini Court applies Byrd and Hanna in unexpected ways.
In Gasperini, the Court first determined that the state procedure was "substantive" and
only then asked whether it "implicate[d]" the twin aims of Erie.193 The Court based its
substance determination on outcome determination or possibly common sense.' 94 The
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' rules are outcome determinative because, without the key
pieces of evidence excluded under the federal standard, plaintiffs will likely lose on
summary judgment; whereas, in some state courts, plaintiffs would have been granted a
chance at trial.' 95 Common sense also suggests that the federal standard makes
substantive policy judgments about the function of tort law and whether juries are
capable of deciding cases based on controversial scientific evidence.' 96 Under the
Gasperini test, the next step is to question whether this substantive federal policy
implicates a violation of Erie's twin aims. As demonstrated in Part V.C, the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits' common laws of evidence admission do implicate Erie's twin aims.
After the Gasperini Court ascertained that the state practice was substantive and
implicated the twin aims of Erie, the Court evaluated whether conflicting federal
interests existed. 197 In Gasperini, the Court specifically discussed the federal interest in
preserving the traditional federal distribution of trial functions betweenjudge and jury
"under the influence... of the Seventh Amendment."' 98 In fact, courts that have had
192. Perhaps the best counterargument comes from Edward K. Cheng and Albert H. Yoon,
who argue that the circuits' interpretation of Daubert does not lead to forum shopping. Edward
K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility
Standards, 91 VA. L. REv. 471 (2005). Their study purports to measure the effect of the federal
Daubert standard on forum shopping by determining whether the federal courts' switch from the
old Frye standard to the Daubert standard increased the rate at which defendants remove cases
from Frye-standard state forums to the federal court. Id. at 482. Cheng and Yoon found "no
evidence that... [the federal courts' adoption of] Daubert ma[de] a difference" to defendants'
removal rates from Frye standard state forums to federal courts. Id. at 511. But defendants may
try to remove to federal court whenever possible because of factors unrelated to Daubert.
Therefore, although Daubert's related common law might encourage forum shopping, its effect
might be negligible.
193. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427-30 (1996).
194. Freer, supra note 141, at 1660.
195. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143; see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1104 n.623 (2003).
196. Seesupra Part V.B.
197. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at431.
198. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537
(1958)). Under the Seventh Amendment's influence, the federal courts assign decisions about
disputed questions of fact to the jury. See id
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occasion to consider Byrd have applied it to the distribution of functions between judge
and jury.199
Since the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' rules assign more power to the judge during
summary judgment and, consequently, less power to the jury, one might assume that
the circuits' holdings preserve the important distribution of trial functions between the
judge and jury. But in fact, as the Gasperini Court implied, the usual application of
Byrd preserves the federal court's Seventh Amendment-inspired practice of jury
supremacy. Historical applications of Byrd do not preserve a federal common law that
takes the power out of the hands of the jury. The Court is unlikely to break with this
tradition to encourage a federal practice that is not "under the influence" of the Seventh
Amendment.2 °
The federal government also retains an interest in maintaining consistency and
administrative ease via a uniform federal standard. Richard D. Freer, a leading Erie
scholar, convincingly argues, however, that asserting a uniformity interest begs the
question. "Federal uniformity is proper only if the matter is not one entrusted by Erie
to state law. The very point of Erie is that uniformity among federal courts must give
way to promote vertical uniformity for citizens of the various states, at least with
regard to substantive matters."20' Moreover, the Supreme Court has referred to
uniformity as "that most generic (and lightly invoked)" federal interest. 20 2 Therefore,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to view the federal interest in uniformity, without more,
as dispositive.
At this point in its analysis, the Gasperini Court rendered a compromise between
state and federal rights. In contrast, the current Erie dilemma forces a "one-or-the-
other" choice. Either the federal court sitting in diversity adopts its own evidentiary
standard or it adopts the standard of the forum state. Since there is no possible
compromise, the Gasperini test dictates that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' evidence
admissions standards, when applied to diversity cases, violate Erie. Therefore, under
all three Supreme Court tests-Hanna, Byrd, and Gasperini-the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits violate Erie in their applications of the Daubert trilogy.
20 3
199. See, e.g., Dill v. Scuka, 279 F.2d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 1960) (citing Byrd in a discussion
about the roles ofjudge and jury in federal and state cases, but not applying Byrd); Walker v.
United States Gypsum Co., 270 F.2d 857, 862 n.12 (4th Cir. 1959).
200. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
201. Richard D. Freer, Erie's Midlife Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1087,1140 n.241 (1989). But
federal courts sometimes see the issue differently. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 508 (1988) ("In some cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform
rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal
rules."); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,275 (1985) (stating that the Court's interpretation of a
statute is supported by federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of
unnecessary litigation); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
202. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994).
203. Christopher Mueller poses an interesting objection to this conclusion. He writes that
although some federal circuits implement different evidence standards from those in the forum
state, the circuits do not violate Erie. The federal circuits' dissimilar standards are not "policy-
driven," but are instead "epistemological." Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right
Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the RightAnswers, 33 SETON HALL L. REv.
987, 1003 (2003). "If the results were policy-driven, one would expect to see opinions linking
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VI. SOLUTION
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have put forth, to varying degrees, a rigorous
common law standard requiring plaintiffs to prove causation by submitting
epidemiological evidence with a relative rate of 2.0 or more.204 This Note has shown
that this rule, applied in diversity cases arising from states with more lenient
evidentiary requirements, violates Erie under all three Erie tests. To avoid the Erie
problem, all federal courts should consider their evidence admission determinations to
be governed by the forum state's substantive common law.
State courts reach results that are unrelated to whether they apply the federally-
favored Daubert standard or continue to rely on the Frye rule to determine evidence
admissibility.2 5 Therefore, the federal courts should neither automatically apply the
federal courts' Daubert precedent when the forum state follows Daubert, nor should
they presumptively invoke a more permissive federal standard when the forum state
follows Frye or a mix of Daubert and Frye. Instead, federal courts need to make a
unique investigation into the common law of the forum state before ruling on any set of
evidentiary standards.
20 6
In deferring to state common law, the federal circuits will respect state policy
determinations about whether the state's tort law should further product safety (pro-
plaintiffs) or encourage increased manufacturer innovation (pro-defendants). The
circuits will also respect the forum state's policy decision to place more trust in judges
or juries. This new federal standard would discourage forum shopping by defendants
and reduce discrimination against forum-state plaintiffs. Such deference would not
infringe upon any substantive countervailing federal interests. Furthermore, the federal
courts would not be overly taxed by the application of a nonuniform standard.
Developing a reference manual for each state's substantive common law of evidence
admissibility would be a relatively quick process. The manual could be updated yearly
the discussion of 'how much is enough' to particular substantive standards, or to the purposes of
tort law as compensatory and loss-spreading, or as shifting to manufacturers only actual costs of
injury while keeping innovation alive ... ." Id. Mueller's understanding of Erie is incorrect.
First, there are opinions linking the evidentiary discussion to policy concerns. See, e.g., Joiner
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. 136 (1997). More importantly, though, even if the federal
government does not strive to implement its own policy, the Erie analysis does not consider the
federal government's intentions, but only its effects.
204. See supra Part III.
205. Berger, supra note 73, at 322; see, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 11 Mass. L.
Rptr. 205 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (following Daubert but allowing epidemiological evidence
with a relative risk of less than 2.0); Hand v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 03A01-9704-CV-00123,
1998 WL 281946, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (following a mixed Frye and Daubert
analysis and holding that an epidemiological study did not have to show a relative risk greater
than 2.0).
206. For example, New Jersey courts follow Daubert, but reject a 2.0 relative risk as a
threshold to admitting epidemiological evidence. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605
A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992) (following Daubert but rejecting a 2.0 relative risk as a threshold
to admitting epidemiological evidence). Conversely, Michigan follows the ostensibly more
lenient Frye standard, but Michigan's state courts do require a relative risk of greater than 2.0.
See, e.g., DePyper v. Navarro, No. 83-303467-NM, 1995 WL 788828, at *33 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 27, 1995) (following Frye but requiring a relative risk over 2.0 to show "statistical
significance" and a relative risk of 2.5 or greater to demonstrate "strong association").
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by district court clerks in each jurisdiction or perhaps by a private enterprise, such as
Westlaw or LexisNexis. Between revised manuals, each court's judicial clerks could
run a brief search at the beginning of each case to determine whether that forum state's
evidentiary standard had recently changed. Even in the absence of a reference manual,
though, the parties to litigation would almost certainly notify the court of any
evidentiary changes, since at least one side would cite the change in order to reap its
benefits.
CONCLUSION
Reacting to pervasive criticism about "junk science" in the courtroom, the Supreme
Court crafted the Daubert test. That opinion was intended to strengthen the trial
judge's role as a gatekeeper in admitting expert scientific evidence, and it did. Daubert
and Joiner established a clear set of federal policy choices. 20 7 First, the federal courts
should trust judicial determinations more than juries' conclusions with respect to
scientific evidence. Second, courts should err on the side of conservative scientific
principles when deciding whether to admit or reject expert evidence. Finally, the
federal trial courts' decisions on plaintiffs' expert evidence should be afforded great
deference.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have promulgated a particularly stringent set of
evidentiary standards based on these policy choices. The Eleventh Circuit requires
presentation of epidemiological evidence that shows at least a doubling of relative
risk. 0 8 The Ninth Circuit similarly requires that admissible epidemiological evidence
display a doubling of the plaintiff's risk, unless the substance at issue is generally
understood to cause harm2°9 or the plaintiff proves that her personal susceptibility is
greater than the average.21° Yet six state courts located in the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits set out a more lenient standard of evidence admissibility than their federal
counterparts.211 The departure from the federal standard is likely driven by the desire to
privilege juries over judges or the fear that the first plaintiffs to contract a disease may
not have the resources to bridge the causation gap.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' rigorous admissibility standards tend to produce
defendant-friendly outcomes. In requiring a more difficult evidentiary threshold for
plaintiffs, the federal courts in those circuits are more likely to dismiss plaintiffs' cases
on summary judgment. Accordingly, diverse defendants are more likely to remove to
federal court when they face civil charges in a more lenient state in the Ninth or
207. See supra Part II.
208. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The
threshold for concluding that an agent more likely than not caused a disease is 2.0."); Magistrini
v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002); In re Breast
Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1274 (D. Colo. 1998); Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors and
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("Since [plaintiff's] probability
estimate [was] not founded upon epidemiological studies showing a relative risk of greater than
two, [it did not establish] 'a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry .... ') (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
209. In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002).
210. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
211. See supra Part III.
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Eleventh Circuit. Such forum shopping enables defendants to elude the consequences
of more lenient state standards. The distinction in evidence admissibility between
federal and state courts consequently provokes the Erie concerns of federalism and
state comity.
In fact, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' strict evidentiary requirements do not
survive the application of a single Erie test.212 These circuits fail the Byrd test because
there is a substantive state interest in enforcing lighter evidentiary standards to preserve
public safety. A Hanna analysis concludes that the circuits violate Erie's twin aims of
discouraging forum shopping and avoiding discrimination against the forum state's
citizens. Finally, a court applying Gasperini would almost certainly find that the
federal interests in uniformity do not outweigh the states' substantive interests in
protecting their citizens. To avoid this Erie problem, federal courts sitting in diversity
should defer to the forum state's substantive common law. In deferring, the federal
courts would neither undergo undue administrative burden, nor would they subvert
their own substantive interests to those of the state. More importantly, though, the
federal courts would recognize and respect state policies that respect juries and favor
consumer safety over manufacturer innovation.
212. See supra Part IV.
2007]

